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Cake day: May 15th, 2026

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  • It must be said that Gorbachev comparing the destruction of socialism and adoption of mass liberalization is not the same as the NEP.

    The legalization of cooperatives during the era of M.S. Gorbachev represented an attempt to salvage the USSR’s deficit-ridden economy. The leadership drew upon the Leninist experience of the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, permitting market elements while preserving the fundamental principles of socialism.

    Gorbachev did not, initially, intend for the collapse of the USSR or a transition to capitalism! The entire initiative was conceived along the lines of the NEP!

    https://csruso.ru/publicistika/njep-i-gorbachevshhina/

    to change our own countries to socialism.

    That is a utopia, Comrade—in the near future.


  • I am disagreeing with you regarding the merits of Mao’s economic practices, which ultimately did lay the groundwork for Reform and Opening Up.

    A comrade forwarded this video to me today.

    The speaker is a former CIA officer. See for yourself what that “openness” actually meant.

    I repeat once more, Comrade: that was not openness, but a CIA operation—staged against the backdrop of escalating tensions between the USSR and China. The U.S. simply took advantage of the situation.

    A comrade forwarded me this video today.

    The speaker is a former CIA officer. See for yourself what that “openness” actually meant.

    I repeat once more, Comrade: that was not openness, but a CIA operation—staged against the backdrop of escalating tensions between the USSR and China. The U.S. simply capitalized on the situation.

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=xVVyS7NtB5k

    And this is not the first time I have pointed out your double standards and contradictions!

    Why won’t you listen to me?

    I repeat once again:

    The criticism of Joseph Stalin—specifically, of his cult of personality—contained in Khrushchev’s report at the conclusion of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, along with the new Soviet course toward economic development under a policy of “peaceful coexistence” with capitalist nations, provoked Mao Zedong’s displeasure, as he viewed them as running counter to the concept of the “Leninist sword” and to communist ideology as a whole.

    By the way, read this too: the CIA had a hand in it as well—the bastards!

    https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000242669.pdf


  • I don’t just mean personal property, I mean private ownership of the means of production and distribution. This is the germ of capitalism, but is not capitalism itself. Socialism and capitalism are systems, you cannot slice up parts of the system and identify some as capitalist and some as socialist.

    I understand all of that, but I’m getting at something slightly different.

    I hope you’ll agree with me that socialism in China is not yet fully built—that it is still in a raw, unfinished state.

    In your view, what will socialism in China look like once it reaches its completed form?

    How will people be induced—through the use of “soft power”—to give up private property? Or will they be compelled to give it up at all?

    However, I sincerely disagree with your underplaying of Mao’s contributions towards the buildup of socialism in China.

    Yes, Mao did lay the industrial and agrarian foundations over the course of several decades—I agree with that.

    However, don’t forget that by the 1940s, the USSR had risen to second place in the world in terms of industrial capacity! Stalin even appeared on the cover of Time. The entire world acknowledged it. And this wasn’t merely a foundation, but a fully operational industrial sector. Furthermore, you can scarcely imagine the destitute state the country was in back in 1930.

    Now, perhaps, you understand why I consider something else entirely to be truly remarkable.

    the term “real socialism” is more religious and sentimental than logical.

    You’re trying to take a jab at me again with this “incorrect socialism” argument.

    Okay, let me be more precise, then. In that video, the host referred to Chinese socialism as Maoism—specifically stating that Maoism is a distorted superstructure built upon Marxism and Leninism. That is precisely—word for word—how it was viewed in the USSR back then.

    And let me reiterate: I didn’t say this to you; the USSR said it. Every single film in the Soviet Union was subjected to rigorous censorship before being aired on television.

    China is under a dictatorship of the proletariat

    Yes—except that the term “dictatorship of the proletariat” was struck from the CPC Charter in the early 80s… in case you didn’t know.


  • Seems to me that it’s most likely Russia is going to ramp things up in the near future.

    Yes, without this, there won’t be any meaning at all…

    And the focus will be on deep strikes on command centres and industry. Lavrov made it pretty clear that gloves are coming off.

    As for industrial facilities—strikes against them will no longer make any serious impression.

    As for decision-making centers—that depends on how effective Russia’s intelligence capabilities are. Russia possesses nothing even remotely comparable to the intelligence assets held by the United States and Israel. I do not believe Russia is capable of executing strikes with such precision. During their recent “retaliatory strike” against Kyiv, they attempted to achieve something, but the result was nil—including in terms of intimidating the civilian population.

    Seems like after Russians went to China they agreed that Ukraine needs to get wrapped up, and that dialogue with Americans is impossible.

    I am skeptical about this. It seems to me that China will not risk a severe escalation with the United States. China will continue to play a waiting game.

    Meanwhile, in Russia—on state-run channels—everyone keeps talking about the “Spirit of Anchorage.” I was reading about it there again just yesterday.

    At this moment, the situation remains uncertain. The Russians have realized that Trump is unable to bring the war to an end. Now, everyone is waiting to see what further actions Russia will take.

    https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=xVVyS7NtB5k

    As the saying goes: the only good CIA agent is a dead CIA agent… )))) However, I think he got his facts mixed up.

    In 1689, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was signed—the first agreement between Russia and China (the Qing Empire). The Russian Tsardom: It lost a significant portion of the Amur region as well as lands along the upper Amur River. Russia was forced to dismantle the fortress of Albazin and liquidate the Russian settlements located there; the border was established along the Argun and Gorbitsa rivers.

    For Russia, this was a humiliating outcome—not the other way around. The second guy was right: China was the one that suffered territorial losses under the Treaty of Aigun, during the reign of Alexander II.

    Comrade, I listened to his take on the conflict over Damansky Island, and it hit me… ))) It turns out that the Soviets were the ones planning to attack China.

    https://www.instagram.com/reel/DYHGeLyuH5O/

    Well, just think about it yourself: China lays claim to Soviet territory—territory that Nicholas II supposedly annexed illegally—yet, despite all this, the USSR is supposedly the one planning to attack China. Does that remind you of anything?.. ))))

    Back then, China had a idée fixe: to tear up the Treaties of Aigun and Peking.

    The Treaties of Aigun and Peking (1858 and 1860) were key interstate agreements between the Russian Empire and the Manchu Qing Empire. They secured vast territories in the Far East for Russia and established the modern border with China.

    At that time, China massed two divisions—15,000 troops—along its border with the USSR and was preparing to launch a major military operation.

    And don’t forget that just a year after the Damansky incident, the Chinese launched another attack—this time along the Kazakh border. Kazakhstan was not covered by the Treaty of Aigun. Kazakhstan has never belonged to China.

    You’ll notice once again that the moment the conversation turns to China, contradictions immediately crop up between us. On every single issue.

    People here keep telling me that I need to “think dialectically” in order to understand it all… ))) But I don’t understand a damn thing…

    I’ve known since childhood that it was China that wanted to attack—not the other way around. I remember that Brezhnev was deeply alarmed by the concentration of forces along the border, yet he issued orders not to succumb to provocations; consequently, the Chinese were met solely by border guards, who held the line against an overwhelming enemy force until the regular army could be brought up. These border guards were subsequently hailed as heroes throughout the USSR, though many of them perished.

    As for the current relations between Russia and China, I would very much like to see what he says come true…


  • The situation here is somewhat more serious.

    This company has secured a contract from the Pentagon to manufacture American-made Shahed-style drones equipped with AI. New models are being tested in Ukraine under combat conditions—something we are witnessing right now.

    https://www.eadaily.com/ru/news/2026/05/27/iz-ssha-edut-na-ukrainu-kak-na-safari-ispytat-smertonosnye-tehnologii-na-rossii

    Currently, Russia and the U.S. are essentially competing in technology. I believe that the U.S. holds the advantage in the use of AI.

    Perhaps China, too, might want to test something of its own… ))

    However, China has no desire to escalate tensions with the U.S., so it is highly unlikely to do so.

    Right now, everyone is anticipating strikes on Kyiv. If this turns out to be yet another “final Chinese warning” from Russia, it will start looking a lot like Trump’s style. The Russians need to take action—but at this moment, I simply cannot imagine what that action could be that would actually take everyone by surprise. Putin currently finds himself in a difficult situation. The Europeans are becoming increasingly brazen; they have refused to evacuate their embassies from Kyiv, thereby demonstrating that they have absolutely no fear of Putin.

    Ukraine’s strategy is clear, and they have staked everything on it: to destabilize Russia internally as much as possible—and as intensely as possible—before the Russian elections this autumn. Their objective is to hold the front lines against any major breakthroughs, while simultaneously inflicting maximum damage through strikes deep inside Russian territory.

    What countermeasures Russia will be able to deploy against this—and whether it will be adequately prepared to do so—remains to be seen.


  • Yes, that is exactly what I was talking about!

    Yes, I did speak about different contexts as well. But the result is the same—regardless of which “NEP” it happens to be, and no matter what it is called: Perestroika, Glasnost, or “Pepsi and McDonald’s.” The Shock Doctrine is what it is called now; back then, Gorbachev dubbed it the New NEP.

    A chasm is forming between the classes—one that widens with every passing year. What we are currently witnessing in China is the consequence of the NEP.

    You claim that the process in China is now reversing. Okay—I won’t dispute that; I will simply observe.

    I will reply to your other posts later.


  • Stalin also made errors and mistakes in socialist construction.

    I’m not arguing.

    You are overweighting Mao’s mistakes and ignoring the successes under Mao

    I can offer my perspective from where I stand—which, as always, is a bit different…

    You overestimate Mao’s achievements while underestimating the assistance provided by the USSR.

    You always focus on Mao’s post-war accomplishments, yet you fail to mention his contributions during the wars against Japan and in the Civil War—periods when he truly demonstrated the full extent of his capabilities, thereby providing the impetus for the unification of China. This is, undeniably, a monumental achievement on his part. His shortcomings and lack of foresight, however, lay in his incompetence regarding economic theory, as well as his subsequent handling of industrial and agrarian policies.

    The abrupt pivot toward the West was not a continuation of Mao’s strategy, but rather a forced measure—a desperate attempt to rescue an economy that had reached a complete dead end. After all, selling one’s soul to the devil is always the very last resort.


  • private ownership under socialism is not capitalism.

    Private property and the means of production are two different kinds of property. I hope Dialectics will overcome this obstacle.

    And I agree with you that China has a unique government system, unlike any other in the world.

    The struggle and unity of opposites. When class struggle rages, socialism is being built; when the struggle ceases, communism begins.

    But we mustn’t forget, as Stalin would probably say in my place, the NEP is a swamp: the further you go, the deeper you sink, and the harder it is to get out.

    However, you’re giving Mao practically none of the credit for overseeing the same tumultuous period Stalin oversaw

    I fully give Mao his due for having governed during the same era that Lenin did. Furthermore—with the assistance of the USSR—Mao laid the foundation for the China of the future. However, those things he attempted to accomplish on his own—or believed he could accomplish single-handedly—did not turn out particularly well.

    For Reference:

    Under Mao Zedong, the foundations of heavy industry were established in China. While the exact number of small-scale enterprises (specifically, backyard furnaces) ran into the hundreds of thousands, there were 154 major industrial facilities of primary importance. These were constructed during the 1950s with active technological and financial support from the USSR.

    Soviet Assistance (1950s): The USSR transferred technology to China and built 154 major industrial enterprises from the ground up. These included giants such as the First Automobile Works (FAW) in Changchun, metallurgical complexes in Anshan and Wuhan, as well as aircraft and machine-building plants.

    The “Great Leap Forward” Campaign (1958–1960): Mao Zedong attempted to accelerate industrialization using artisanal methods. Approximately 600,000 small, makeshift blast furnaces for smelting steel were constructed across the country. The attempt failed: the resulting steel was of poor quality, and the campaign triggered a massive economic crisis and famine.

    The “Third Front” Program (1960s): Following the rupture in relations with the USSR, China began constructing military, heavy industrial, and machine-building plants in the country’s interior—specifically in the mountainous and hard-to-reach western provinces—in preparation for a potential war. Several hundred such facilities were erected, although their economic efficiency proved to be extremely low.

    Now, pay particular attention to the years 1958–1960. This was precisely when Mao began “hunting sparrows,” scapegoating them as the cause of all the nation’s failures. In reality, the true culprit was the disastrous failure of his project involving the backyard blast furnaces operated by the peasantry. I spoke about this earlier.

    Now, just judge for yourself: how much simpler it would have been to simply turn to Soviet specialists—who, at the time, were world leaders in steel production—rather than embarking on that monstrous gamble, which ultimately led to the starvation of the peasantry.

    How do you assess such a decision coming from a man who was the leader of a vast nation? I call it a reckless decision! He didn’t want to invest money in large-scale industrial enterprises—the way Stalin did over the course of a decade; he wanted to achieve it faster, and solely at the expense of the peasants.

    Just think about how absurd that sounds: becoming the world leader in steel production on the backs of the peasants.

    How does that even make sense, Comrade? There is only one explanation: Mao confused steel with rice cakes.

    We had a similar “corn tycoon” of our own… Khrushchev, who thought the U.S. had built its wealth on corn… the moron!

    And mind you, I’m not drawing my data from books by modern Russian authors; I’m drawing it from old Soviet films.

    If you could actually understand what is being said in them, your ears would shrivel up, and all your dialectical musings would hit a brick wall. This is a subject you know absolutely nothing about.

    But I won’t translate it for you—I wouldn’t want to kill the poet inside you.

    https://youtu.be/Ny28m_9TSDM

    Most importantly, the man narrating the clip states that he created this film for one specific reason.

    He is a writer, and he had a falling-out with his colleagues—fellow socialist writers from the GDR and France.

    Do you know why they fell out?

    Now, take a deep breath, Comrade.

    Because he argues that the socialism practiced in China isn’t real socialism…

    I’m not making any assertions here myself; I’m simply showing you archival footage from the 1970s.

    Neither Mao nor Stalin were perfect.

    I completely agree with you.


  • The NEP did achieve its desired effect of socializing the means of production and centralizing them.

    I already told you that I completely agree with this. If it hadn’t been for the NEP, civil war would have broken out again. The factories were then partially returned to the hands of their former owners. And what’s most interesting is that many of these owners, after the NEP was abolished, remained at the factories, not as owners, but as directors. Many small entrepreneurs emerged, and the workers were pacified.

    As for the peasants, problems began immediately. Peasants in the USSR at that time were divided into three categories: “poor peasants,” “middle peasants,” and “kulaks.” The kulaks immediately seized the initiative, began exploiting the poor, and engaged in usury. They felt like local princes in the villages. The poor were their farmhands, the middle peasants their debtors. “Kulak” in English means fist. This person holds the entire peasant community in his fist. This term emerged after Stolypin’s reforms.

    Kulaks and middle peasants refused to sell grain to the state because the market price was much higher than the state price. Italian barges were docked in Crimea, transporting grain to Europe.

    I observed something similar during perestroika, when the market price was several times higher than the state price. When store shelves were empty, but the market was a paradise of abundance.

    You probably remember those students who robbed the NEPmen in the 1920s. You’re talking to one of them now, but I’m from the 1990s, when, as a university student, I was underfed, starving, and didn’t even always have enough money for public transportation. I didn’t have decent clothes. For the first time in my life, I understood what hunger was.

    Every morning, looking out the tram window at the luxurious boutique windows and expensive cars, I was filled with hatred for these people! Fierce hatred!!! I turned to crime. That fucking NEP ruined my entire life, because it all ended with me going to prison. And you can’t imagine how many millions of lives like mine have been ruined! Just like that, in an instant!

    Just like in the 1920s and 1990s in the USSR, both NEPs smoothly transitioned from the intelligentsia into criminals, and from traders and speculators into the ruling class, so now we’re smoothly transitioning from dialectics to Freudian psychoanalysis. For me, the NEP isn’t the New Economic Policy; for me, the NEP is childhood trauma.

    Yes, this is a subjective opinion, of course. It’s my opinion and that of many millions of others like me. Those who rebelled against injustice. Rebelled in a strange way, but rebelled! Probably because I was hungry.

    We are now talking about the dark side of the NEP, no matter what the NEP is, red, white or green, the side effect of the NEP is the same everywhere.






  • Regarding car ownership, it’s rising dramatically even in the last year. At one point it was far more limited, but the DPRK’s economy is booming and trade with China is rising.

    It’s about time…

    As for China’s rural conditions, I’m well aware of the urban/rural gap

    As we recently discovered, this is a side effect of the NEP. It has spawned a class of wealthy individuals who will be incredibly difficult to combat later on. They will not simply yield to “soft power.” They must be “dekulakized.” How this is to be carried out in practice, I do not understand.


  • You’ve probably read the interview with Stalin conducted by the “Tucker Carlson of his day,” haven’t you? … )))

    In 1934, Herbert Wells traveled to Moscow and interviewed Stalin. This was a time when Stalin was personally orchestrating the genocide of the Ukrainian people; he barely had time to wash his hands—they were perpetually stained with blood… ))))

    And what did Wells have to say after that interview?

    “I confess that I approached Stalin with a certain degree of suspicion and prejudice. In my mind, I had constructed an image of a very cautious, inwardly focused fanatic—a despot, envious and suspicious, a monopolizer of power. I expected to encounter a ruthless, cruel doctrinaire and a self-satisfied Georgian highlander whose spirit had never fully escaped the confines of his native mountain valleys… All the vague rumors, all the suspicions—for me, they ceased to exist forever after I had spoken with him for just a few minutes. I have never met a man more sincere, decent, and honest; there is nothing dark or sinister about him, and it is precisely these qualities that explain his immense power in Russia. Before our meeting, I assumed he held his position most likely because he was feared; now, however, I understand that he is not feared—he is trusted.”

    H.G. Wells

    1934

    Can you imagine just how cunning and insidious one would have to be to so thoroughly pull the wool over Wells’s eyes?.. )))))

    And this is all the more remarkable given that Wells actually disagreed with Stalin on many points.

    Wells also met with Lenin, though he wasn’t particularly fond of him.

    Perhaps that was because, at that time, the results of the socialist revolution were not yet visible—only the revolution itself… the grain requisitioning and “War Communism.” Whereas by the time he met with Stalin, there were already concrete results…



  • I don’t think there is any reason to doubt his data. If he were distorting the facts, it would have come to light long ago—he has been publishing on this subject since 1995.

    He is currently the most authoritative and widely recognized expert in Russia regarding the Stalin era—and beyond—at least within certain progressive circles. In these circles, everything has long since been double-checked.


  • I appreciate the recommendation, comrade, though unfortunately I can’t find it in English (yet).

    Specifically for our conversation, I would like to briefly introduce you—in outline form—to the contents of Yuri Nikolayevich Zhukov’s book, The Flip Side of NEP (Обратная Сторона НЭПа):

    Crisis Phenomena: According to the researcher, the partial return to market mechanisms did not lead to the long-awaited economic boom; instead, it triggered a protracted economic crisis.

    Political Struggle: The transition to the NEP (New Economic Policy) exacerbated latent conflicts within the USSR’s party elite (during the 1923–1925 period), resulting in a fierce struggle for power.

    Social Stratification: Economic liberalization led to the rapid enrichment of a narrow social stratum—the “NEPmen”—a situation that stood in stark contrast to the dire plight of the majority of workers and peasants.

    As you can see, there exists a radically different perspective on the events of that era. Zhukov is an archivist; his work relies primarily on archival documents. In his books, every claim is substantiated by the figures and statistical indicators of those years, which form the core of the economic analysis within his work. The political struggle is evidenced in the minutes of party meetings, while social stratification is clearly visible in criminal police reports. One such report, for instance, describes the formation of a student gang in Moscow that specialized in robbing NEPmen. A great number of such motley gangs sprang up, triggering a rampant surge in crime.

    Indeed, we know that between 1919 and 1921, “War Communism” was implemented at the behest of Trotsky. Both Trotsky and Lenin indulged in fantasies of a global revolution; they fully expected that a wave of socialist revolutions would erupt across Europe at any moment, and that the Red Army would immediately rush to their aid. Consequently, the army was effectively transformed into a “labor army.”

    It was a truly terrible time for the workers and peasants. Soldiers were not demobilized from the army; instead, they remained under barracks conditions, working in factories and receiving no wages—only food and clothing. Yet, even these basic necessities the state was unable to provide in sufficient quantities. As the situation deteriorated, unrest and strikes began to erupt in the factories; workers refused to work. Measures had to be taken. To breathe some fresh life into the economy, War Communism was abolished and the NEP was introduced; however, as it turned out, this dawn was short-lived. As for the notion that the NEP was actually effective in the USSR—that was a myth later inflated by Gorbachev in order to push through his own hare-brained ideas.